From Exile to Amnesty:
Liang Chi-Chao’s Unsuccessful Advocacy
for Reform
Laura Beth Noble
22565697
Hist. 345 – Third Paper
Liang Chi-Chao advocated for strengthening and modernizing China through reforms issued by a newly installed constitutional monarchy. Liang never personally led a successful reform movement; however, in an interesting turn of events, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 originated from his students along with others inspired by his ideology. His works, along with those of Kang You-Wei, under whom Liang studied the Confucian Classics, planted the seeds from which revolutionary ideas grew. During his subsequent fourteen-year exile, Liang Chi-Chao tirelessly fought for his vision of a modern china—from his home in Japan, by travelling for meetings and speeches with the international Chinese community, and continuing to publish writings promoting reform. After the last Qing emperor abdicated the throne in 1912, Liang continued to influence the political climate as an outspoken critic of the practicality of a Chinese republic, which he saw as “irreconcilable with China’s conditions and national traits” (New York Times, 1911b). He died at the age of fifty-five, having failed to bring China into the modern age under a constitutional monarchy.
Involvement in the Hundred Days of Reform
There seems no reason to doubt the existence of a monarchical faction containing men of strong intellect; men like Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chiao, who were seasoned reformers before some of to-day’s leaders had cut their revolutionary milk-teeth (North China Herald, 1911a).
In 1895, Kang You-Wei and Liang Chi-Chao wrote a memorial to the Emperor Guangxu as they went to take the jinshi exams. This memorial, “while remaining faithful to the fundamental values of Confucianism,” called “for institutional changes inspired by the Western and Japanese experiences,” specifically “the establishment in China of a constitutional regime,” or a constitutional monarchy similar to the Japanese Meiji Restoration (Bergere, 1994, 45). Corruption within the dynasty kept the palace memorial from reaching Guangxu until 1898, three years later. As the Empress Dowager Cixi spent her days at the Summer Palace, Guangxu’s tutors were bringing him the works of reformers, sparking his interest in leading a movement from the throne. During the Hundred Days of Reform, from June to September of 1898, over fifty decrees from Emperor Guangxu, with such reformers as Kang You-Wei, Liang Chi-Chao, and Tan Si-Tong as his advisors, issued a number of reversals in Chinese tradition: civil service exams would now focus on current international affairs, an upheaval of the Confucian schooling system by placing modern schools in every province, the creation of a national newspaper, the nationalization of large-scale infrastructure and railroad projects, among others, while giving progressive reformers credentials to serve in the capital and thus removing conservatives from their appointments.
In 1911, the New York Times attempted to sum up the events from the summer of 1898 in an article on Kang You-Wei. This description of the events is uninspiring at best, implying that Kang somehow “won his way to the throne,” in order to “begin the education of the Emperor along his lines of thought;” in actuality, the Emperor Guangxu requested his attendance (New York Times, 1911d). And although many of the edicts dealt with issues proposed by the earlier self-strengtheners, never before had there been “such a coherent body of reform ideas presented on imperial initiative and backed by imperial prestige”—indicating just how influential Liang’s reform ideas were during his time (Spence, 1999, 228). Liang had literally brought his movement to the imperial level, but the author of the Times article misunderstood the intentions of these reforms. Further stating that “temples were thrown open to be used as schools,” this indicates the foreign misinterpretation of the Chinese system of Confucian values (New York Times, 1911d). Just because the civil service exams would now be based outside of the Confucian Classics, it does not imply a religious turnover of any kind as the article assumes.
On September 21, 1898, the Empress Dowager Cixi issued an edict of her own. Claiming that Guangxu had requested that she return to power, the Empress Dowager placed him under palace detention, ending Liang’s “dreams for a coherent program of reform to be coordinated by the emperor in the name of a new China” in disaster (Spence, 1999, 229). Fortunately for Liang Chi-Chao, the “Japanese leaders looked with a favorable eye upon the attempt of the Hundred Days Reform” and “offered help to the reformist leaders”—Liang Chi-Chao found refuge in the Japanese consult at Tianjin, and was later taken to Tokyo by way of a Japanese gunboat (Bergere, 1994, 77).
Exile
Liang Chi-Chao is the best known literary man among the Chinese. He has been an exile since the palace revolution of 1898 (New York Times, 1911a).
Upon taking refuge in Japan, Liang “emerged as the leader of the anti-imperialist patriots and the radical young intelligentsia,” fighting against the growing foreign economic spheres of influence in mainland China (Bergere, 1994, 430). The North China Herald indicates that from 1898 to 1911, Liang “has rendered inestimable service to the Chinese people by his writings on various subjects” (North China Herald, 1911d). For instance, from 1905 to 1907, he defended the constitutionalists’ cause in his New People’s Review, which was the coexisting rival publication to Sun Yat-sen and his Revolutionary Alliance’s People’s Journal (Bergere, 1994, 430). It is important that Liang kept up his fight for Constitutionalist reform, for, at the time, “Sun Yat-sen’s bold call for revolutionary activism was steadily becoming more compelling” than the “more cautious call for constitutional monarchy and protection of the emperor Guangxu” (Spence, 1999, 238). Even as the “originator of student radicalism,” Liang Chi-Chao himself became alarmed by the turn of student unrest in Tokyo and continued to rally for gradual change, still convinced that any internal disorder would only provide foreign powers with an excuse to meddle and create aggression (Bergere, 1994, 111-2). Many of the young Chinese students in Japan saw Liang’s New People’s Miscellany as a guide to radical intellectual reform, echoing his principal themes and repeating his attacks on imperialism. Throughout Miscellany, he “deplores the decline of Chinese institutions, the poverty of the people, the corruption of officials, and, above all, the aggressive policy of foreign powers” (Bergere, 1994, 104).
He also actively campaigned among overseas Chinese and foreign governments. Usually soft-spoken among the press, Liang “made an exception [in 1911] in the case of [one] interviewer who represented one of the great news agencies of the world,” the Associated Press (North China Herald, 1911c). The English-language newspaper in China, The North China Herald, declined to include that the news agency was in fact AP; instead it is realized by noting the Herald article included exact quotes from an interview with Liang printed in the Times a few months prior. Upon closer inspection, excerpts from this rare interview with the international press show up in at least four more articles that year between the two newspapers.
Connection to the 1911 Revolution
[Liang Chi-Chao,] the originator of the reforms toward which the “new China” is now heading, the man whose name is on the lips of thousands of his countrymen, here and in other lands… (New York Times, 1911d)
The Times, on November 7, 1911, published that “Liang Chi-Chiao, a hero and idol of the Chinese reformers, who is regarded as the greatest of Chinese exiles, to-day discussed the situation in China” through a statement to the Associated Press (New York Times, 1911b). Liang first discusses the matter of the “present revolutionary uprisings” in Wu-Chang and Shanghai, stating that they “were spontaneous, without prearrangement,” against his reforms for gradual, institutional change (New York Times, 1911d). He is referring to the October rebellions of the New Army, when it was discovered that nearly one-third were also members of the Revolutionary Alliance. Fearing for their lives, a mutiny erupted. Harping on this display of incompetence, the Herald quotes Liang as telling AP that the problem now is a “question of leadership” among the revolutionaries, simply stating the information was telegraphed by “one of the responsible news agencies” (North China Herald, 1911c). In regards to the ultimate success of a Republic run by the newly installed premier Yuan Shi-Kai, Liang is “extremely doubtful,” explaining how he believes “the final restoration of peace and order will be effected by someone other than Yuan or the present revolutionaries” (New York Times, 1911d). The nature of Liang Chi-Chao’s statement to AP on November 6, 1911 clearly demonstrates his fading support for the revolutionary movement’s reforms, and that he does not agree with their choice of leadership. Interesting to note, Liang sought out a foreign press group to release his feelings on the situation, rather than a Chinese-language periodical. Perhaps even he could feel his influence on mainland China waning?
Amnesty
Hidden away in a recent dispatch from Peking…was a meager mention that Kang Yu Wei had been pardoned and recalled from exile. Kang’s name was coupled with that of Liang Chi Chao, and the single phrase “eminent reformers” did descriptive duty for both (New York Times, 1911e).
Pardoned by the new National Assembly, Liang Chi-Chao originally resists lending his influence to help Yuan Shi-Kai’s emerging Republic. The New York Times claims that on November 14, 1911, Liang returned to China to discuss “measures necessary for the protection of the dynasty,” continuing to push for Imperial reform (New York Times, 1911a). On November 17th, the Times released information that an edict from Yuan Shi-Kai appointed Liang Chi-Chao as Vice President of the Board of Justice, but adds this appoint is “curious” because Liang “was exiled by the late Empress Dowager at Yuan Shi-Kai’s suggestion” (New York Times, 1911e). The appointment is not mentioned in The North China Herald until November 23rd, where his exile is left unmentioned, in favor of simply stating that “since the year 1898 he took up his abode in Japan” (North China Herald, 1911d). Two days later, on November 25th, the Herald published a telegram from Liang Chi-Chao to “The Press, Shanghai,” where he declines the official position by firmly stating he “will never accept the appointment” (North China Herald, 1911d).
Fighting for a Constitutional Monarchy from Within the Republic
According to this authority, Liang Chi-Chiao, the exiled Chinese editor and the most influential Chinese of letters, is returning to the capital from Japan for the purpose of directing the activities of the reformers (New York Times, 1911c).
Eventually, Liang did return to mainland China to head the Progressive Party and sit as a member of the National Assembly. The Times claimed he returned to Japan to “take an active part in the reform” movement once again, with plans to head a “Reformed Party” (New York Times, 1911c). Finally breaking away from his mentor Kang You-Wei and the Society to Protect the Emperor, who were still advocating for the last Manchu emperor, Puyi, to return to the throne, Liang “rallied to the new republican regime established in 1912,” eventually becoming “active in its parliament as the leader of the Progressive Party” along with “accepting a number of posts of responsibility under Yuan Shikai” (Bergere, 1994, 430).
Now Yuan Shikai’s Republic, China, if not for the radicalism of the Revolutionary Alliance, may have, on its own, transformed into a constitutional monarchy under the Qing Dynasty. In a wave of reforms to curb the destruction of the dynasty from 1901-1910, committees were formed to study the constitutions of other nations. All returned with the same verdict—it would be in the best interest of China’s future to follow the precedents of the United States and Japan, specifically during the Meiji Restoration where the ruling family was allowed to keep some semblance of power upon the changeover to a constitutional monarchy. The 1895 palace memorial from Kang You-Wei and Liang Chi-Chao to the Emperor Guangxu expressed those exact sentiments over a decade earlier. If only these early reform movements were not divided by the question “of whether to give priority to the antidynastic struggle or to anti-Western resistance,” in opposition to the true nature of China’s role in the worldwide community (Bergere, 1994, 355). Author Marie-Claire Bergere (1994) proclaims in her novel, Sun Yat-sen, that “this thinking, led by men of exceptional culture and talent,” such as Liang Chi-Chao, “which borrowed from the West but did not entirely repudiate the East, represents one of the highest points of modern Chinese political thought during its first golden age,” the years 1895 to 1911 (356). Liang Chi-Chao, though he pioneered the constitutional movement in China with Kang You-Wei, failed to bring his reform ideas to the imperial stage and execute them. Coming close during the Hundred Days of Reform over the summer of 1898, Liang continued thereafter to lose his influence over the Chinese-nationalist students in the years approaching the 1911 Revolution.
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